The Global Financial Crisis initiated a period of market turbulence and increased counterparty risk for financial institutions. Even though the Dodd-Frank Act is likely to exempt interbank foreign exchange trading from a central counterparty mandate, market participants have the option to trade currency futures on existing futures markets which standardize counterparty risks. Evidence for the period 2005-11 indicates that the market share of currency futures trading has grown relative to the pre-crisis period. This shift may be the result of a perceived increase in counterparty risk among banks, as well as changes in relative trading costs or changes in other institutional factors.
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FX Counterparty Risk and Trading Activity in Currency Forward and Futures Markets I. Introduction
The Global Financial Crisis initiated a period of turbulence the effects of which are still impacting financial markets. In some respects, the foreign exchange (FX) market performed well during the crisis. Trading volume held up throughout the crisis and continues to be robust. The CLS Bank, a relatively new intermediary for settling a substantial fraction of interbank FX transactions worked as planned, eliminating delivery risk for counterparties using the CLS system.
1 However, in other respects the FX market was like a barometer for gauging market disruption. After the first signs of a developing crisis in summer 2007, deviations from Covered
Interest Parity, the arbitrage condition that links the forward premium on currency to the shortterm offshore interest differential between a pair of currencies, ballooned from under 10 basis points to 50 and then several hundred basis points after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008. Around the same time, the TED spread (i.e. the spread between short-term U.S.
Treasuries and short-term Eurodollar bank rates) experienced a similar pattern where the spread moved sharply upward in the summer of 2007, and then shot up to unparalleled levels after the Lehman bankruptcy. While policy changes and the process of normalization of market conditions have had the beneficial impact of reducing CIP deviations and the TED spread considerably, both measures are still substantially greater than in the pre-crisis period. And both
measures are yet two more indicators of a new normal where heightened risk and risk aversion 1 CLS Bank estimates that they provided settlement risk elimination services for 68% of the global foreign exchange market in April 2010 for the 17 currencies that are CLS eligible.
seem to be driving a larger wedge between the traditional linkages in international financial markets.
In this paper, our interest is in exploring some of the implications that follow based on the perception that counterparty risk has grown among many traditional FX market participants.
Of special interest here, the Dodd-Frank Act (2010) mandated that swap transactions must be traded and cleared through a centralized counterparty (CCP). Despite the critical importance of foreign exchange and the enormous volume of daily interbank FX trading, in April 2011 the U.S.
Treasury proposed that FX swaps and forward contracts be exempted from the CCP mandate.
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Whether or not the U.S. Treasury proposal is adopted, market participants have the alternative to substitute the use of currency futures contracts traded and cleared through a CCP in place of currency forward contracts traded and settled through the interbank market. The general hypothesis we wish to examine is whether these developments (i.e. preservation of the status quo in trading and settling arrangements for FX swaps and forwards; and rising idiosyncratic risks among various important financial institutions) have helped induce FX market participants to migrate trading activity toward centralized trading and clearing organizations. As currency market participants assess their risks of dealing in the FX market, counterparty risks may be greater or more difficult to gauge in the current environment, inducing a preference for the transparency and reliability afforded by a CCP.
Because data on interbank market trading is more limited than data on futures market activity, our statistical methodology is somewhat limited. However, based on the data that are 2 In the 2010 survey, FX swaps and outright forwards accounted for 47% and 13% respectively of the nearly $4 trillion daily global turnover volume. However, the U.S. Treasury (2011, p. 7) reaffirmed that FX options, currency swaps, and non-deliverable forwards would not be exempted from the Commodity Exchange Act's definition of a swap.
available, the data suggest that since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis the volume of trading in currency futures has grown and gained market share while the market share that can be attributed to interbank currency forward contracts has declined. Possible explanations for the shift toward currency futures include an increase in bank counterparty risks, especially at the onset of the European sovereign debt crisis in late 2009. However other possible explanations such as a relative increase in interbank trading costs or other institutional changes need to be considered.
In the next section, we review some metrics that summarize the impact of the crisis on international capital mobility. We then outline the basic architecture for interbank currency trading and highlight the important but limited role played by the CLS Bank in reducing delivery risk for interbank currency transactions. In Section IV, we describe our data on currency forward and futures market trading activity, and then present our analysis of that data in Section V. A summary of the results with policy implications and suggestions for follow-up research are in the final section.
II. Some Metrics of the Global Financial Crisis
The ongoing history of the Global Financial Crisis is well-documented and numerous studies have analyzed its origins. 3 For our purposes, however, the Covered Interest Parity (CIP) relationship can be taken as nearly a sufficient statistic for the trading and operational efficiency of the foreign exchange market. 4 The gist of CIP is that arbitrage activity will drive the oneperiod interest differential on a pair of currencies, i($) -i(£), toward equality with the forward currency premium, F-S/S, when the exchange rates are expressed in units of $/£. In a perfect market with transactions costs at zero and no counterparty or default risk, arbitrageurs would insure that deviations from CIP are zero. While meaningful deviations from CIP were observed in the first half of the twentieth century, once the offshore markets (then referred to as "Euromarkets") developed in the 1960s, numerous economic studies confirmed that for the major currencies trading in liquid markets, CIP deviations were very small, and almost always smaller than the cost of engaging in arbitrage. The economic implications of these deviations from CIP were critical. European banks that might normally borrow USD from US banks were effectively shut out due to the crisis and 7 Graphs of other exchange rates reveal a similar pattern of small CIP deviations during the tranquil period up until the summer of 2007, followed by a period of increasing turbulence and larger CIP deviations, and then a large spike in deviations after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. In most cases, CIP deviations are now generally larger than at the start of the millennium. 8 Griffoli and Ranaldo (2011) analyze CIP deviations using high frequency data on 5 currency pairs including the EUR-CHF, a non-dollar pair. The authors conclude that most CIP deviations can be explained by funding liquidity constraints in USD, and only a small part due to the risk of default by the forward counterparty. Hence, based on this dataset, the possibility of risk was not a major factor in limiting arbitrage and opening up CIP deviations.
heightened concerns about counterparty risks, banks' desire to retain adequate risk capital, and the declining economic climate. Europeans could create USD synthetically by borrowing EUR and completing an FX swap, but this raised their costs by the excess of the deviation from CIP.
In In sum, data on deviations from CIP, the TED spread, and particularly CDS rates suggest that credit risk and counterparty default risk have increased for large international financial institutions relative to their pre-crisis levels.
III. Simple Mechanics of Interbank Foreign Exchange Trading and the Role of the CLS Bank
telex, telephone, or web-based network depending on the available technology. Using a voice broker, or for the last 25 years or so an electronic broking system, allows the bank dealers to remain anonymous until the trade is agreed upon and delivery and settlement information is 12 Linking the equity and FX pieces of the transaction could be desired to take account of timing differences in clearing and settlement between equity and FX. Litigation is now pending between several U.S. pension funds and custodian banks regarding alleged irregularities in FX trades that were bundled with equity transactions. See Dash (2009) and Dash and Lattman (2011) .
The structure of FX trading has some important differences compared to equity and futures market trading, especially those trades executed on an organized exchange. As noted above, the foreign exchange market is a geographically dispersed market with no centralized trading floor. Trading in the major currency pairs (EUR/USD, USD/JPY, and GBP/USD) is essentially continuous throughout the 24-hour day, although trading is more active as the major trading centers (i.e. Tokyo, followed by Europe, and then the United States) have their sequential normal business hours. Unlike most equity and futures markets, there is no national regulatory authority that oversees interbank FX trading. prices between Banks C and D at any instant of time. Perhaps more important, because banks in 13 There are industry groups in many of the major trading centers who work to develop guidelines for FX trading and best practices for operational risk management. The web site of New York's Foreign Exchange Committee (see http://www.newyorkfed.org/fxc/links.html ) provides further information and links to other sites. 14 Some studies suggest that it is the opaque nature of the foreign exchange market that enables market-makers to profit. Banks may take an incoming order to buy or sell at a small deviation from market prices, and then cover their position quickly without much impact on prices. See Yao (1997) and Lyons (2001) . Hafeez and Brehon (2010) suggest that some corporate clients and equity investors are somewhat price insensitive, as they view foreign exchange as a cost rather than their mainline business, which further supports the prospects for profitable marketmaking. KfW delivered approximately EUR 300 million to a Lehman Brothers European bank account. However, once it declared bankruptcy, Lehman did not produce its USD leg of the transaction. 17 The U.S. Treasury (2011) pointed to a well-functioning settlement process plus the fact that FX swaps and forwards require a physical exchange of currency on fixed terms set at the outset of the contract and other factors as reasons to exempt FX swaps and forwards from the requirement in the Dodd-Frank act for a central clearinghouse for derivative securities. The U.S. Treasury proposal was offered in April 2011 and has yet to be enacted.
case, Bank B's default on its leg of the original transaction will inflict a partial loss on Bank A, but not a total loss had it decided to settle bilaterally rather than by using the CLS Bank.
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To restate this result more succinctly, for interbank FX trading, the CLS Bank entirely mitigates the possibility of delivery risk but each counterparty retains the price risk element of credit risk in the event that one counterparty fails to deliver its leg of the transaction. In that event, the surviving counterparty must seek a new counterparty to complete the original deal, running the risk that the new price from the new counterparty will be inferior to the original price arranged with the original now defunct counterparty.
Thus, while the CLS Bank creates an enormous benefit for the interbank FX market, it does not completely mitigate the counterparty risk that is a feature of any bilateral transaction. 18 The price risk associated with default could be more important for forward contracts where there is a longer period between booking the trade and delivery, and therefore more time for one counterparty to fail prior to settlement date. 19 Quoted in Oliver (2005) .
By comparison, currency futures contracts traded on a centralized exchange all carry the identical counterparty risk of the clearinghouse that stands behind each futures contract. Thus an agent who transacts in currency futures eliminates both the delivery risk and price risk that accompany a bilateral forward FX contract in the event of default. The trade-off is that the agent accepts the cash flow risk that comes with the mark-to-market convention of futures contracts, and the residual risks that come from using a standardized futures contract rather than a customized currency forward contract. 20 The recent bankruptcy of MF Global also brings to light the risk that brokerage firms could misappropriate customer margin account funds needed to support futures trading. While futures exchanges are likely to make brokerage firms subject to more stringent guidelines regarding investing customer funds, customer confidence in the system has been impacted.
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Overall, the institutional features of the two venues suggest that with the increase in bank counterparty risk and the imperfect mechanism in the interbank market for mitigating counterparty default risk, agents may be attracted to centralized currency futures markets as a way to reduce their exposure to these risks. At the same time, banks may be less keen to deal with, or arrange prime brokerage relationships for new or smaller currency players, leaving them to trade in futures markets.
IV. Data on Currency Forward and Currency Futures Trading Activity
Data on currency futures trading activity is readily available as these contracts are traded on regulated exchanges. We collected daily data from Bloomberg on the volume of trading for 
V. Empirical Results
EUR-USD Futures and Forwards
In this paper, we concentrate on data for the EUR-USD exchange rate which is the most actively traded currency pair in the interbank FX market, capturing 28% of all FX market turnover according to the BIS 2010 survey. The second most active pair is the USD-JPY rate which reflects 14% of all market turnover. The shares of turnover for the other four currencies GBP, AUD, CAD and CHF (against the USD) are 9%, 6%, 5% and 4% respectively making a total 66% share of total FX turnover for these 6 currency pairs.
Exhibit 4 shows the daily average trading volume for EUR futures on the CME and According to the BIS 2010 survey, these four locations accounted for 36.7%, 17.9%, 5.3% and 3.8% respectively (or collectively 63.7%) of all global FX turnover. Japan which was omitted because it provides data only in April and not October accounted for 6.2% of all FX turnover. However, daily average trading in EUR-USD outright forwards in the April survey months was only about $1 billion in Japan. And Canada, the final omitted country for lack of EUR-USD data accounted for only 1.2% of FX turnover in the BIS 2010 survey. So the impact of omitting Japan and Canada in these calculations should not be material.
bankruptcy as market participants rushed to liquidate positions, raise liquidity, and reduce exposure to foreign exchange risks. Thanks to the CLS Bank and the virtual certainty that delivery risk could be assumed away gave banks the confidence to trade in quantity with counterparties around the world. 23 However, by April 2009 the economic contraction had taken hold and the volume of both outright forwards and currency futures shrank to levels somewhat lower than their pre-crisis levels.
In the six surveys since the October 2008 spike, the upward trend in volume has resumed and noticeably at a steeper rate of increase for currency futures compared with currency forwards. Post-Lehman Brothers, the daily average volume of currency futures has expanded by 102% from $29.8 billion in April 2009 to $60.2 billion in October 2011. By comparison, over the same period the daily average volume of currency forwards grew by only 25% from $57.6 billion to $71.8 billion. Expressing these data in terms of market share, Exhibit 5 shows that the market share of CME currency futures has risen to somewhere in the mid-40% range whereas prior to the crisis, the CME share was in the low 30% range.
To probe a bit further, it would be interesting to examine whether this shift in market share is the result of an increase in the rate of growth in futures trading, or a decrease in the rate of growth in forward market trading, or both. Unfortunately, because of the limited data on interbank trading activity, only rough answers are possibly. Exhibit 6 shows the daily average of trading for CME futures on the EUR based on a 3-month moving average (right scale). The results of the 13 surveys of the interbank forward trading are superimposed (left scale). The graph makes the visual impression that CME futures volume for the EUR is growing at roughly the same rate post-crisis as it was pre-crisis. The disruption associated with the crisis itself, and 23 See Levich (2009) for a discussion of the CLS Bank and FX trading activity over this period.
the difficulty in dating the start, or end, or the crisis makes sharper comparisons problematic. For the interbank market, leaving out the spike on October 2008, the data give the impression of a shift down in volume, and possibly also a slow down in the rate of growth.
Futures and Forward on Other Currency Pairs
We also collected data on the volume of futures trading for the five other currency pairs Given the general depreciation of the USD against our sample currencies, the USD value of contracts traded on the CME has grown considerably more for the AUD, but also to some extent for the CAD, JPY and CHF. The USD tended to strengthen versus the GBP, so that the growth in the USD value of contracts traded is slightly less than the growth in contract volume.
Finally, Exhibit 9 provides estimates of the percentage market share of CME trading volume in the combined market of futures and forwards. As mentioned earlier, these estimates are only available for April and October when the FX Committees survey interbank market trading activity. Data for the EUR in column 1 was reviewed earlier. These data suggest that the CME's market share for EUR currency futures has risen to somewhere in the mid-40% range whereas prior to the crisis, the CME share was in the low 30% range. The increase for the AUD is considerably greater, with the CME's market share is in the 35-40% range now versus 20-30% prior to the crisis. There also appears to be growth for the CME's market share in the CAD, although the share itself appears small at only 10%. For the other three currencies (GBP, JPY, and CHF), the CME's market share shows no clear pattern of change post-versus pre-crisis.
Incorporating the annual April interbank numbers from the Tokyo survey for the JPY shows the impact (as expected) in the CME market share estimate when Tokyo's interbank forwards are included, but there is still no clear pattern of change in market share.
VI. Summary and Policy Implications
The onset of the Global Financial Crisis and the Lehman bankruptcy were clearly watershed events that disrupted virtually all aspects of national financial markets and international financial market relationships. While the deep dislocations associated with the crisis are past, deviations from Covered Interest Parity have increased significantly relative to precrisis levels, signaling a decrease in international capital mobility. In addition, a second shock emanating from the European sovereign debt crisis and concern over the creditworthiness of banks generally have kept CDS rates high even though monetary authorities have taken steps to address the capital mobility problem.
Despite the increased awareness of risk and the desire to insulate financial institutions from future dislocations, the U.S. Treasury has recommended that FX swaps and forwards be exempt from using a central counterparty for clearing and settlement. This recommendation was based in part on the judgment that foreign exchange already enjoys a well-functioning settlement process (of which the CLS Bank is one element) and that FX swaps and forwards require a physical exchange of currency on fixed terms set at the outset of the contract. However, FX 
